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Abstract
Many models show that redistribution is bad for growth. This paper argues
that in a non-cooperative world optimizing, redistributing (’left-wing’) gov-
ernments mimic non-redistributing (’right-wing’) policies for fear of capital
loss if capital markets become highly integrated and the countries are tech-
nologically similar. ’Left-right’ competition leads to more redistribution
and lower GDP growth than ’left-left’ competition. Efficiency differences
allow for higher GDP growth and more redistribution than one’s opponent.
Irrespective of efficiency differences, however, ’left-wing’ governments have
higher GDP growth when competing with other ’left-wing’ governments.
The results may explain why one observes a positive correlation between
redistribution and growth across countries, and why capital inflows and
current account deficits may be good for relatively high growth.
Keywords: Growth, Distribution, Tax Competition, Capital Mobility
JEL classification: O4, H21, D33, C72, F21
∗This paper builds on research that I have conducted at the European University Institute
in Florence. I would like to thank Tony Atkinson, James Mirrlees, Robert Waldmann and
Robert K. v. Weizsa¨cker for helpful advice and stimulating suggestions. I have also benefited
from comments by Cornelis Los and Thomas Werner as well as presentations at the EEA, T2M,
NASM, DEGIT VII, Saarland University, and WIFO in Vienna. Furthermore, I am grateful
for helpful comments by three anonymous referees. Of course, all errors are my own. Financial
support by the Deutscher Akademischer Austauschdienst (DAAD), grant no. 522-012-516-3, is
gratefully acknowledged.
†Correspondence: TU Darmstadt, FB 1/VWL 1, Schloss, D-64283 Darmstadt, Germany.
phone: +49-6151-162219; fax: +49-6151-165553; E-mail: rehme@hrzpub.tu-darmstadt.de
1 Introduction
Many theoretical models argue that redistribution causes low growth and/or cap-
ital outflows. See e.g. Perotti (1993), Bertola (1993), Alesina and Rodrik (1994),
or Persson and Tabellini (1994). Yet despite globalization many countries re-
distribute a significant share of their GDP and have high growth. For instance,
Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Perotti (1994) or Sala-i-Martin (1996) find a signif-
icantly positive relation between redistribution and growth across countries.
This empirical observation may be reconciled with theory by models along
the lines of Galor and Zeira (1993), Saint-Paul and Verdier (1996), Lee and
Roemer (1998), or Aghion, Caroli, and Garcia-Pen˜alosa (1999). However, they
are usually set up for closed economies, and do not explicitly address the issue of
what happens if the ”cake” to be redistributed is mobile.1
This paper investigates precisely that issue by placing the equity-growth prob-
lem in an open economy framework. It is argued that long-run growth depends
on policy in a non-cooperative world and that the growth-redistribution trade-off
and with it the policy-growth-nexus crucially hinges on technological efficiency
differences and the possibility of capital outflows in interdependent economies.
Usually it is shown that redistribution towards the non-accumulated factor of
production causes lower growth in closed economies. That trade-off is extended
here to a two-country, infinite-horizon world. The accumulated factor of produc-
tion is identified with capital and the non-accumulated factor of production with
(raw) labour. Building on Alesina and Rodrik, the governments are taken to tax
the capital owners’ wealth which is to be interpreted as a metaphor for many
kinds of redistributive policies that transfer resources to the non-accumulated
1For surveys of the growth-redistribution literature see, for example, Be´nabou (1996) or
Bertola (1999). Growth in interdependent economies has e.g. been analyzed by Lucas (1990),
Barro, Mankiw, and Sala-i-Martin (1995), or Ventura (1997).
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factor of production while reducing the incentive to accumulate.2
It is commonly acknowledged that labour is less mobile across countries than
capital. To capture that all agents are taken to be immobile in the paper. In con-
trast, capital can be transferred across countries and that is modelled as having
a direct bearing on the productivity of capital employed in production. Wealth
is taxed at source and it is shown that the capital owners optimally allocate
their capital depending on the after-tax returns on capital in the economies.3 In
the market equilibrium with given policies domestic aggregates grow at a bal-
anced but not necessarily steady rate. This is so because policy or technology
differences imply capital allocations which have important intertemporal effects
on the growth of the domestically operating but productively different capital
stocks. The paper analyzes these differences by putting structure on policy first.
In the model governments are non-cooperative by engaging in tax competi-
tion.4 An entirely pro-capital (’right-wing’) government maximizes the national
investors’ worldwide income. In a closed economy it maximizes the after-tax re-
2For examples of what other redistributive mechanisms the wealth tax scheme metaphori-
cally captures see Alesina and Rodrik’s paper.
3Taxation in open economies has received attention in e.g. Canzonieri (1989), Gosh (1991),
and Devereux and Shi (1991), and Chamley (1992). For capital income taxation in open
economies the ”residence” or the ”source” principle are commonly advocated. Under the ”source
principle” all types of income originating in a country are taxed uniformly, regardless of the
place of residence of the income recipients. If a country may suffer from capital losses and
absent any problems arising from transfer pricing, the source principle appears more suited as
a tax principle, because governments in a non-cooperative environment cannot perfectly monitor
their residents’ income or wealth. See, for instance, Bovenberg (1994). Other justifications for
why the assumption of the ”source principle” for income taxation is still empirically relevant
can e.g. be found in Gordon and Hines (2002), p. 1943, and Giovannini (1990). Therefore, in
the paper the source principle for wealth taxation is adopted as a tax rule. For recent models
using the source principle for income taxation see e.g. Lejour and Verbon (1997) and Strulik
(2002). For an analysis with tax competition in Europe using the ”residence principle” see
e.g. Mendoza and Tesar (2003a) and Mendoza and Tesar (2003b).
4By assumption the wealth tax is a metaphor for redistributive mechanisms. Consequently
tax competition among countries introduces non-cooperative behaviour in that metaphoric tax
instrument. Concentrating on non-cooperation seems realistic in a world where long-run and
binding agreements are difficult to enforce. Tax competition has been studied in numerous pa-
pers such as, for instance, Gordon (1983), Wilson (1986), Wildasin (1988), Bond and Samuelson
(1989), Kehoe (1989), Sinn (1990), Persson and Tabellini (1992) or Kanbur and Keen (1993).
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turn on capital and so growth and does not redistribute in the model. In contrast,
an entirely pro-labour (’left-wing’) government is concerned about redistribution,
GDP and its growth.
In open economies and for technologically similar economies redistribution
is shown to be lower relative to the optimal, closed economy policies. As the
right-wing government is not concerned about redistribution, it just maximizes
the after-tax return on capital. By that it maximizes growth, but also attracts
foreign capital. Under common knowledge the left-wing government knows it
cannot attract foreign capital. As a consequence and compared to its optimal,
closed economy policy it chooses to redistribute less, to lose capital implying
lower (initial) wages and to have relatively higher GDP growth. Interestingly,
the foreign workers under a right-wing policy will benefit in this situation.
When two left-wing governments compete the strategic interaction between
them is more intense as each government wants to get some capital off its op-
ponent. In a symmetric equilibrium the left-wing governments redistribute, but
less than in a closed economy. They face the trade-off between growth and re-
distribution, but they also need capital for high GDP. For fear of capital loss
they set lower tax rates than in a closed economy. Hence, tax competition causes
an optimizing left-wing government to concentrate on securing sufficiently high
GDP and wages. By that the effects of the concern for redistribution are reduced.
As the integration of capital markets increases and no matter which opponent
they face, the left-wing governments are shown to begin mimicking right-wing
policies. For equally efficient economies the model has the surprising implication
that a left-wing government is better off in terms of GDP growth if it faces
competition from another left-wing government. That goes with the cost of a
reduction in redistribution. Competing against a right-wing government in turn
3
leads to relatively more redistribution in the optimum, at the cost of reduced
GDP growth.
However, when an efficiency gap can be maintained the government with a
technologically superior economy may attract capital. That is especially true
for a left-wing government. If the gap is large enough, it redistributes and has
higher GDP growth than a right-wing opponent. Thus, the growth redistribu-
tion trade-off is not so much a question of preferences, but rather a problem of
being efficient or not (technology). Interestingly and contrary to some policy
debates, it is shown that for a sufficiently efficient economy very high capital
market integration (”globalization”) does not necessarily constrain a nationally
preferred redistribution policy. Interestingly, the theoretical results also imply
that countries with relatively high growth should have capital inflows and so
current account deficits.
As countries differ widely in their technologies this may provide one expla-
nation for the empirical findings on the growth-redistribution-nexus in the cross-
country studies mentioned above. In this paper I find tentative empirical support
of the theoretical predictions for rich OECD countries. In particular, there seems
to be evidence that structurally left-wing countries with relatively higher taxes,
redistribution, and capital inflows are not doing worse in terms of growth than
structurally right-wing countries.
The paper is organized as follows: Sections 2 and 3 describe the economies and
derive the equilibrium. Sections 4 and 5 introduce policy. Section 6 analyzes tax
competition. Section 7 presents some empirical evidence. Section 8 concludes.
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2 The Model
Consider a two-country world with a domestic and a foreign economy. The
economies are real ones and we abstract from nominal assets.5 Denote variables
in the foreign country by a (*). There are finitely many, identical individuals in
each country, who are all equally impatient. By assumption individuals who own
capital do not work, but they invest; in contrast workers never save and consume
their entire income.6 Each economy’s population is immobile and normalized so
that one may think of workers and capital owners as one person each. These
persons derive logarithmic utility from the consumption of a homogeneous, mal-
leable good that is produced in the two countries. By assumption all goods and
capital stocks can be transferred costlessly between the economies. Following
Barro (1990) aggregate domestic production takes place according to
Yt = AK
α
t G
1−α
t L
1−α
t , where 0 < α < 1 (1)
and Yt is output produced in the home country, Gt are public inputs to produc-
tion. Furthermore, Lt = 1 so that the domestic labour endowment is inelastic and
constant.7 The economies are otherwise identical and differences between them
are due to A which is an efficiency index reflecting cultural, institutional and tech-
nological development. If A = A∗ the economies are called similar. Otherwise,
5This assumption follows e.g. Turnovsky (1997), ch. 6.
6This is a standard assumption which has been used by e.g. Kaldor (1956) and many others
since then. See e.g. Judd (1999). In this context Bertola (1993) has shown that for utility
maximizing agents who do not own initial capital it is not optimal to save/invest out of wage
income along a balanced growth path. Similarly, it is not optimal to work for those who only
own capital initially. The present paper builds on that result. The logic of the model would not
change if instead one introduced a representative household who derives wage as well as capital
income and makes investment decisions, and the government represented ’economic classes’
within that household.
7Thus, we abstract from scale effects due to population size as in Alesina and Rodrik (1994).
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they are called different. I abstract from problems arising from depreciation of the
capital stock. Kt is an index of the domestically productive capital stock in the do-
mestic economy. It takes the form Kt = f(ωtkt, (1−ω∗t )k∗t ) = ωt kt+φt (1−ωt) k∗t
where kt (k
∗
t ) is the real capital stock owned by domestic (foreign) capitalists.
8
The variable ωt ∈ [0, 1] denotes the fraction of real capital at date t owned
by domestic capitalists that is retained at home for domestic production. The
foreign owned capital stock k∗t that becomes domestically productive depends on
φt = φ(ω
∗
t , z) = max
{
, ω∗t
1
z
}
, where 0 ≤ ω∗ ≤ 1, z ≥ 0, (2)
and  is positive and small. The assumption of a small  means that there is a
(relative) minimum (marginal) productivity of foreign owned capital operated in
the domestic economy. The φ function captures that the productivity of foreign
owned capital that is operated domestically depends on the amount foreigners
send to the home country. This function satisfies 0 ≤ φt ≤ 1, φω∗t ≥ 0, limz→∞φt = 1
and lim
z→0
φt = . The φ functions are symmetric for the economies and imply the
following: The amount of domestically owned capital, ωtkt, entering domestic
production is fully productive at home. In contrast, the foreign capital owners
may send (1 − ω∗t )k∗t to the domestic economy, but their (the foreign owned)
capital stock is not as productive in the domestic economy as in their home
(foreign) economy. This is due to locational disadvantage effects as e.g. argued
by Wong (1995), ch. 13. These effects depend on the amount of foreign owned
capital that is sent to the home country. In particular, the assumption dφ
dω∗t
≥ 0
implies that if foreign capital owners send some of their capital to the domestic
economy (a decrease in ω∗ and, thus, an increase in (1−ω∗t )), then the productivity
8Capital may be taken as broadly defined. Thus, it may thought of as including disembodied
technological knowledge (blueprints), which is not always equally productive across countries.
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of foreign owned capital operated in the domestic economy falls.9 From this one
easily verifies that ω∗t → 1 implies φ→ 1. Thus, when the foreigners do not send
any capital to the domestic economy, their capital is potentially as productive as
domestically owned capital. Furthermore, ω∗t → 0 implies φ → . Thus, when
the foreigners send all their capital to the domestic economy, their capital is not
very productive in the domestic economy.
The parameter z indicates how productive foreign owned capital is in domestic
production, for a given allocation of foreign capital (1 − ω∗t )k∗t . Note that φ is
non-decreasing in z, for given ω∗t .
10 Thus, a higher z implies that foreign owned
capital generally becomes more productive in the domestic economy.
2.1 The Firms
The firms in each country are owned by domestic or foreign capital owners who
rent capital to the domestic firms. The firms operate in a competitive environ-
ment, act as profit maximizers, cannot influence the public inputs to production,
and take the technology, in particular, the productivity indicator φ as given.11
Furthermore, we assume the following: Domestically owned capital may be
used for the production of foreign type or domestic type good in the foreign
economy. If the domestic capitalists send their capital abroad in order to pro-
duce there, they choose to pay the foreign workers (and the government) in foreign
type good. But they choose to pay themselves in domestic type good. By as-
sumption the foreign (domestic) firms using domestically (foreign) owned capital
9It can only fall until φ = , that is, until foreign capital hits its minimal productivity in
the domestic economy. Thus, foreign owned capital in domestic production always contributes
at least a little bit to the generation of domestic output.
10If φ is such that φ = ω∗t
1
z , then dφdz = − 1z2 (lnω∗t ) ω∗t
1
z which is positive when ω∗t < 1.
11Thus, the (small) firms ignore their influence on these variables so that both Gt and φ
represent externalities, which the firms do not take account of when making their decisions.
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can produce both types of good and once the capitalists have chosen which type
of good is to be produced, one cannot change a domestic type into a foreign type
good. Thus, if there is any domestically owned capital abroad (or any foreign
owned capital in the domestic economy), the prices of the two types of goods
must be the same, because, otherwise, a profit maximizing firm would produce
only that good which commands the higher price. Hence, a firm using foreign
owned capital in domestic production will produce both types of goods only if
the prices of the goods are equal. That price serves as nume´raire and is set equal
to 1.
The domestic firms rent foreign or domestic capital, and hire labour in spot
markets in each period in their country. Profit maximization then entails that
firms pay each factor of production its marginal product
∂Yt
∂(ωtkt)
= αA M = rt ,
∂Yt
∂((1− ω∗t )k∗t )
= φ rt ,
∂Yt
∂Lt
= (1− α)A M Kt = wt , where Lt = 1,∀t and M ≡
(
Gt
Kt
)1−α
.
(3)
Due to the productivity differences the marginal product of foreign owned capital
in domestic production is generally lower (φ ≤ 1) than that of domestically owned
capital. Note that the marginal products depend on government policy through
the amount of public services supplied.
From the factor input prices one can infer that the marginal rate of technical
substitution (MRTS) between domestically and foreign owned capital operated
in the domestic economy is given by φ, which the firms take as given and which
corresponds to the relative price of the the two capital stocks. Notice that φ is
not constant in general since it is (implicitly) determined by the investors abroad
through their choice of ω∗t . Thus, φ(ω
∗
t ) is also a measure of the substitutability
8
between the two capital stocks in domestic production with MRTS = φ(ω∗t ).
Notice that these capital stocks are in general not perfect substitutes. Calculating
the (direct) elasticity of substitution of domestically owned for foreign owned
capital, σ, for ω∗t such that φ ∈ (, 1) yields (see appendix A)12
σ =
z ω∗t
1− ω∗t
. (4)
The elasticity increases in ω∗t for given z. It also increases in z for given ω
∗
t . That
means that the substitutability between domestically and foreign owned capi-
tal decreases (σ falls) as more foreign owned capital enters domestic production
(lower ω∗t , larger (1−ω∗t )). Following Hicks (1936), this is interpreted as a situa-
tion where domestically and foreign owned capital become more ”co-operant” as
more foreign owned capital enters domestic production.13
In contrast, a higher z, implies that the two capital stocks become more
”rival”, that is, substitutable. This form of rivalry, captured by z, will be called
capital market integration.14 Thus, z is taken to represent the capital market
integration in this paper. If z → 0, then the capital stocks will be complete
complements, and the capital market is not integrated. If, on the other hand,
z → ∞, then the capital market in perfectly integrated, the capital stocks are
perfectly substitutable and so ”rival”.15
12Clearly, if ω∗t approaches 1 (foreigners leave their capital in their country) or 0 (foreigners
shift all of their capital abroad), then φ will be a constant and the capital stocks would be
perfect (φ → ) or potentially perfect (φ → 1) substitutes in domestic production, σ → ∞.
However, these cases will not be relevant for the equilibria analyzed in this paper.
13Thus, as more foreign equipment enters domestic production it is combined in a more
complementary way with domestic equipment.
14Capital market integration is also taken as an indicator of ”globalization” in this paper.
15For this note that z → ∞ implies φ = 1 so that both capital stocks would get the same
return in the domestic economy.
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2.2 The Public Sector
The domestic government taxes the market value of capital (wealth), that is,
ωtkt + φ(ω
∗
t )(1 − ω∗t )k∗t at the rate τ . Thus, the government taxes less than
(1−ω∗t )k∗t because if it raised τ(1−ω∗t )k∗t in order to buy capital in the domestic
market to provide them as public inputs in production, the buyers of that type
of capital would only be willing to pay φ per unit of k∗t for it, since foreign
capital is less productive at home. Recall that foreign owned capital yields income
φrt(1 − ω∗t ) at home. Therefore, the price per unit of foreign capital at home
equals φ which is less than that of domestic capital. Then the total market value
of foreign capital is given by φ(1−ω∗t )k∗t . This way of taxing wealth corresponds
to the source principle requiring that all types of wealth in a country be taxed
uniformly, regardless of the place of residence of the owners of wealth.
The governments run balanced budgets and use the tax revenues for providing
public inputs to production so that τKt = Gt. Thus, from equation (3)
r = αAτ 1−α and wt ≡ η(τ)Kt = (1− α)Aτ 1−αKt (5)
so that the domestic return on domestically owned capital is constant and higher
than the domestic return φtr on foreign owned capital. The wages are not con-
stant, but grow with the domestically productive capital Kt.
2.3 The workers
The workers derive a utility stream from consuming their entire wages that are
not taxed by assumption. Their intertemporal utility is given by
∫ ∞
0
lnCWt e
−ρtdt where CWt = η(τ)Kt. (6)
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2.4 The capitalists
The capitalists are identical and have perfect foresight. They choose how much to
consume or invest and take (r, r∗, φ, φ∗, τ, τ ∗) as given. Thus, the domestic capital
owners are price-takers in the domestic and foreign country. Although they own
part of the foreign firms, they do not know that, when they send capital abroad,
that will have an impact on productivity abroad and the returns they receive
there. Thus, the domestic capital owners have no market power abroad and take
φ∗ as given. However, as they may invest in either country, they determine where
their capital is to be located. Hence, their problem is
max
Ckt , ωt
∫ ∞
0
lnCkt e
−ρtdt (7a)
s.t. k˙t = (r − τ) ωtkt + (r∗ − τ ∗)φ∗ (1− ωt)kt − Ckt (7b)
0 ≤ ωt ≤ 1 (7c)
k(0) = k0, k(∞) = free. (7d)
The capitalists’ dynamic budget constraint in (7b) captures that the capital own-
ers allocate their capital to the home or foreign country depending on the return
on their capital. If they allocate ωtkt to the home country they receive r. If they
allocate (1−ωt)kt to the foreign country, only φ∗(1−ω)kt will become productive
and they will only receive capital income r∗φ∗ (1− ωt)kt abroad. By assumption
all goods and stocks can travel freely and re-investment of profits earned in a
country is costless in that particular country.16
The solution to the capitalists’ problem is standard (see appendix B) and
16The worldwide investment of the domestic capital owners int is the sum of what they invest
at home, in1t and of what they invest abroad, i
n
2t. Since goods and stocks can travel freely
in1t = ωtk˙t and i
n
2t = (1−ωt)k˙t which explains the k˙t term on the LHS of the budget constraint.
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implies that the optimal capital allocation is constant17, and given by
ωt =

1 : (r − τ) > (r∗ − τ ∗)φ∗
∈ [0, 1] : (r − τ) = (r∗ − τ ∗)φ∗
0 : (r − τ) < (r∗ − τ ∗)φ∗.
(8)
Thus, in the optimum the capitalists immediately shift their assets to the country
where the after-tax return on capital is higher. Hence, relative to the planning
horizon the speed of capital relocation is short. Let ω˜ denote the optimal capital
allocation according to equation (8). Then the capitalists’ consumption grows at
the rate
γ ≡ C˙
k
t
Ckt
= (r − τ)ω˜ + (r∗ − τ ∗)φ∗(1− ω˜)− ρ, (9)
which is constant over time and depends on the after-tax returns in the two
countries. Furthermore, the capitalists set their consumption at Ckt = ρkt in the
optimum. Thus, their consumption and wealth grow at the same rate.
3 Market Equilibrium
According to the optimal capital allocation decision of the domestic capitalists, ω˜,
domestically owned capital is shifted to the economy where the after-tax return is
highest. For this the domestic capitalists take φ∗ as given. However, the allocation
decision will have an effect on φ∗(ω) in equilibrium. We rule out extreme after-tax
return differentials between economies and consider the case where φ∗ < 1.
1. If r−τ > (r∗−τ ∗)φ∗, the domestic investors will all shift their capital to the
17Notice that this implies that φ∗ and, by analogy with the foreign capitalists’ optimum, φ
must also be constant in any equilibrium.
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domestic country, ω = 1. But then φ∗(ω) will rise until r− τ ≥ (r∗− τ ∗) ·1.
But then clearly, ω˜ = 1.
2. If r−τ < (r∗−τ ∗)φ∗, the domestic investors will all shift their capital to the
foreign country, ω = 0. But then φ∗(ω) will fall until r− τ = (r∗− τ ∗)φ∗(ω)
in equilibrium. But then clearly, 0 ≤ ω˜ < 1.18
In this equilibrium with (r−τ) = (r∗−τ ∗)φ∗(ω) and φ∗ = ω 1z we then have
ω
1
z =
r − τ
r∗ − τ ∗ and ω˜ =
[
r − τ
r∗ − τ ∗
]z
if (r − τ) < (r∗ − τ ∗).
Hence, the optimal capital allocation in equilibrium is given by
ω˜ = min
{(
r − τ
r∗ − τ ∗
)z
, 1
}
. (10)
For the domestic economy this means the following: If (r − τ) ≥ (r∗ − τ ∗), we
have ω˜ = 1. For (r − τ) < (r∗ − τ ∗), we have ω˜ = ( r−τ
r∗−τ∗
)z ≤ 1.
The growth rate of consumption of the capital owners depends on ω˜ as follows:
1. If (r − τ) ≥ (r∗ − τ ∗), then ω˜ = 1 and so γ = (r − τ)− ρ.
2. If (r − τ) < (r∗ − τ ∗), then ω˜ = ( r−τ
r∗−τ∗
)z
and
γ = (r − τ) ( r−τ
r∗−τ∗
)z
+
[(
r−τ
r∗−τ∗
)z] 1z (r∗ − τ ∗) (1− ( r−τ
r∗−τ∗
)z)− ρ
= (r − τ)− ρ
18The following is also a theoretically possible case: If r − τ << (r∗ − τ∗)φ∗, and the after
tax return differentials are extreme, the investors would all shift their capital to the foreign
country. But then φ∗(ω) might fall until r − τ < (r∗ − τ∗) . But then clearly, ω˜ = 0 and
the foreign after-tax return must be huge relative to the domestic one because  in (2) is small
by assumption. This is ruled out in the paper since it is usually not observed, that is, return
differentials by a factor of more than, say, a 100 are ruled out.
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The fact that the growth rate of the capital owners consumption and wealth
always grows at a rate that depends on the domestic after-tax rate of return
only, is clearly a simplifying property of the model and depends on the simple
capital allocation function. However, notice that, first, depending on the domestic
return these growth rates may be very different, and, second, that an equalization
of returns by (free) capital allocation is shared by many models in the literature.
Importantly, however, there may be an asymmetry between wealth accumulation
for foreign and domestic capital owners in the model. This is captured by
Lemma 1 In equilibrium the growth rate of the domestic capital owners’ wealth
and consumption is determined by the domestic after-tax return on their wealth.
In a two-country equilibrium we have
γ = ω˜(r − τ) + (r∗ − τ ∗)φ∗(1− ω˜) = (r − τ)− ρ (11a)
γ∗ = ω˜∗(r − τ) + (r − τ)φ(1− ω˜∗) = (r∗ − τ ∗)− ρ (11b)
where (r − τ) 6= (r∗ − τ ∗) is possible.
Before discussing the implications of this result further we will analyze the closed
economy first.
3.1 The Closed Economy
The closed economy equilibrium is characterized by steady state, balanced growth
with γY = γk = γ = γCW and ω = 1. The growth rate is first increasing and then
decreasing in τ and maximized when
τ = τˆ ≡ [α(1− α)A] 1α . (12)
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Following Alesina and Rodrik’s paper redistribution is defined here as any pol-
icy that reduces the incentive to accumulate. Taking growth maximizing policies
as a benchmark has its virtues since people appear to have difficulties disentan-
gling the relationship between utility enhancing income growth and the distrib-
ution of income at each point in time. See e.g. Amiel and Cowell (1999). Thus,
any policy τ ≷ τˆ redistributes and lowers growth in the model.19
3.2 Two-Country World
Consider the domestic economy with arbitrarily given tax rates and so fixed ω˜ and
ω˜∗. In the open economy equilibrium the capitalists’ consumption grows at the
same, constant rate as their wealth. The same holds for the foreign capitalists.
The total wealth of the domestic capitalists at any point in time is kt and the
budget constraint satisfies k˙t = γkt = (r − τ)ω˜kt + (r∗ − τ ∗)φ(1− ω˜)kt − Ck.
3.2.1 World Goods Market Equilibrium
With given ω˜, ω˜∗ the world resource constraint is
k˙t + k˙∗t = (r + η)Kt + (r
∗ + η∗)K∗t −Gt −G∗t − Ckt − Ck
∗
t − CWt − CW
∗
t (13)
where Kt = ω˜kt+φ(1−ω˜∗)k∗t , K∗t = ω˜∗k∗t +φ∗(1−ω˜)kt, Gt = τKt and G∗t = τ ∗K∗t
since the governments run balanced budgets and the production functions imply
Yt = rKt + ηKt and Y
∗
t = r
∗K∗t + η
∗K∗t . As Lemma (1) and private sector
19An alternative redistribution mechanism could be that a fraction of tax revenues is spent
in the form of direct transfers to workers. See Alesina and Rodrik (1994), p. 466. However,
the paper’s qualitative results for open economies would not change if one introduced such a
separate policy instrument. See Rehme (1995) or Rehme (1997).
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optimality entail
k˙t + k˙∗t = γkt + γ
∗k∗t = [ω˜(r − τ) + (r∗ − τ ∗)φ∗(1− ω˜)− ρ] kt
+ [ω˜∗(r − τ) + (r − τ)φ(1− ω˜∗)− ρ] k∗t
the world resource constraint is met.
3.2.2 Wealth and Accumulation of Net Foreign Assets
Wealth in each economy is given by
Wt = ω˜kt + (1− ω˜)kt = kt and W ∗t = ω˜∗k∗t + (1− ω˜∗)k∗t = k∗t ,
and world wealth amounts toWt+W
∗
t = kt+k
∗
t . As regards the allocated capital
(wealth) we use the following definitions:
Vt ≡ ω˜kt + (1− ω˜∗)k∗t and V ∗t ≡ ω˜∗k∗t + (1− ω˜)kt, (14)
where Vt denotes the capital that is domiciled in the home economy, and V
∗
t
represents the capital that is domiciled in the foreign economy.
Thus, domestic wealth is given by Wt = Vt +Nt, where Nt is defined by
Nt ≡ (1− ω˜)kt − (1− ω˜∗)k∗t (15)
and denotes the net foreign assets for the domestic economy.20 If Nt > 0, then
the domestic country has positive net foreign assets, and is a creditor. If Nt < 0,
then the domestic country has negative net foreign assets, and is a debtor.
20Thus, −Nt = (1− ω˜∗)k∗t − (1− ω˜)kt denotes the net foreign assets of the foreign economy.
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Thus, domestic wealth is Wt = Vt +Nt and foreign wealth is W
∗
t = V
∗
t −Nt.
For convenience we will drop time subscripts from now on. The current account
balance is then given by the change in net foreign assets, i.e.
N˙ = (1− ω˜)k˙ − (1− ω˜∗)k˙∗. (16)
Using the household budget constraints, the optimality conditions of the firms,
and the government budget constraints one obtains (see appendix C)
N˙ = Y − C −G− V˙ + (r − τ)φN + [(r∗ − τ ∗)φ∗ − (r − τ)φ] (1− ω˜)k, (17)
starting from initial N0, V0 and k0. In equation (17) domestic GDP equals output
Y = (r+η)K, and aggregate domestic consumption is denoted by C = Ck+CW .
The equation expresses that the rate of net foreign asset accumulation equals
domestic output (Y ) less domestic absorption (C + G + V˙ ) plus the net inter-
national flow of earnings on foreign assets. For given tax rates, the rate of net
foreign asset accumulation also depends on the allocation of the domestically
owned capital stock, as reflected by (1− ω˜)k.21
Intertemporal solvency of the current account requires
lim
t→∞
Ne−[(r−τ)φ]t = 0, (18)
which is satisfied in equilibrium. See appendix D. Analogous reasoning applies
to the foreign economy.
21For a similar result see Turnovsky (1997), p. 217.
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3.2.3 Equilibrium Growth of GDP
In equilibrium GDP grows at the same rate as output Y which in turn grows at
same rate as Kt, because Gt and Kt grow at the same rate. As all goods can
travel costlessly, consumption adjusts at each point in time so as to maintain
equilibrium.
Let νt ≡ ω˜ktKt and ν∗t ≡
φ(ω˜∗)(1−ω˜∗)k∗t
Kt
denote the shares of domestic and foreign
owned capital in domestically productive capital. The domestic economy is then
characterized by balanced, but not necessarily steady growth, since the evolution
of the domestic economy is determined by
Γt ≡ K˙t
Kt
=
γω˜ k0 e
γt + γ∗φ(1− ω˜∗) k∗0 eγ∗t
ω˜ k0 eγt + φ(1− ω˜∗) k∗0 eγ∗t
= νtγ + ν
∗
t γ
∗ (19)
which is a weighted average of the growth rates of the domestic and the foreign
capitalists’ capital, allocated to the domestic economy.
Clearly, if ω˜∗ = 1, then Γt = γ and so constant over time. However, if ω˜∗ < 1,
then Γt will not be constant, because
dΓt
dt
=
(
γ2ω˜ k0 e
γt + γ∗2φ(1− ω˜∗) k∗0 eγ∗t
)
Kt −
(
K˙t
)2
K2t
= (γ − γ∗)2∆
where ∆ =
ω˜k0 eγt φ(1−ω˜∗)k∗0 eγ
∗t
K2t
. In fact, Γt is increasing over time, unless γ = γ
∗.
Also
lim
t→∞
Γt|γ>γ∗ =
γω˜k0 + lim
t→∞
γ∗φ∗e(γ
∗−γ)tk∗0
ω˜k0 + lim
t→∞
φ∗e(γ
∗−γ)tk∗0
= γ.
Lemma 2 The equilibrium is characterized by balanced growth at the rate Γt.
1. If there is no foreign owned capital in the domestic economy, ω˜∗ = 1, then
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Γt = γ and constant over time.
2. If there is foreign owned capital in the domestic economy, ω˜∗ < 1, then Γt
is increasing over time, dΓt
dt
> 0, for any γ 6= γ∗. If γ > γ∗, then Γt < γ
and lim
t→∞
Γt|γ>γ∗ = γ.
Thus, if γ > γ∗, the GDP growth rate Γt is smaller than the growth rate of
the domestic capital owner’s wealth. This captures that foreign owned capital
operating in the domestic economy puts a drag on domestic GDP growth, be-
cause it is less productive there. On the other hand the level of GDP is higher
which is good for domestic wages. In the long run GDP growth will approach γ
which would correspond to the economy’s growth rate when the country remained
autarkic.
Clearly, ω˜ and ω˜∗ are important for the open economy equilibrium. As they
depend on the tax rates, structure on policy is introduced next.
4 The Government
The governments respect the right of private property22 and maximize the welfare
of their domestic clientele, thus, representing national interests only. Integrat-
ing (6) and (7a) yields that the domestic capital owners’ intertemporal welfare
(superscript r) is
V r =
∫ ∞
0
lnCkt e
−ρtdt =
lnCk0
ρ
+
γ
ρ2
. (20)
22Although the model’s command optimum would involve expropriation of the capital stock
even for a government maximizing the welfare of the capital owners, it is ruled out as it is not
common in the real world.
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Hence, a government serving domestic capitalists only is concerned about the
capital owners’ worldwide income and not GDP or GDP growth.
The welfare measure of the domestic workers (superscript l) integrates to
V l =
∫ ∞
0
lnCWt e
−ρtdt =
lnCW0
ρ
+
1
ρ
∫ ∞
0
Γt e
−ρtdt. (21)
As wages depend on the productive capital stock, a government serving the
workers only must be concerned about the level and growth of GDP.
5 Closed Economy Policies
Suppose the government maximizes a mixture of the agents’ welfare. Such a
government would choose (see Appendix E)
τ [1− α(1− α)Aτ−α] = ρβ(1− α), (22)
where β is the social weight attached to the workers’ welfare. The tax rate
solving this equation is denoted by τˇ and is greater than τˆ . As dτˇ
dβ
> 0 and so
dγ
dβ
< 0 more political power going to labour implies that growth is traded off
against redistribution in the model. Thus, small differences in welfare weights
induce different after-tax returns and growth. Notice that an entirely pro-capital
(β = 0), that is, a right-wing government is only concerned about capital income,
and in the model it chooses the growth maximizing tax rate τˆ .
Given the qualitative nature of the effects of different welfare weights on
optimal policies, the paper concentrates on the polar cases of right-wing, entirely
pro-capital (β = 0), and of left-wing, entirely pro-labour (β = 1), policies in the
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open economy analysis below.23
Furthermore, the following is worth noting: First, the after-tax return under
the right-wing policy is maximal and given by rˆ − τˆ = τˆ ( α
1−α
)
. From (12) an
increase in A raises growth, the after-tax return and taxes under that policy.
Second, from (22) an increase in A under a left-wing policy implies
dτ
dA
= α(1− α)τ (τα − α(1− α)2A)−1 > 0
since τˇ > τˆ .24 Furthermore, dγ
dA
= rA + (rτ − 1) dτdA > 0 if
ατ 1−α >
(
1− α(1− α)Aτ−α) [α(1− α)τ (τα − α(1− α)2A)−1]
τα − α2(1− α)2A > (1− α)τα − α2(1− α)2A
which is equivalent to 1 > 1− α and true. Thus,
Lemma 3 In the closed economy an increase in efficiency implies higher tax
rates, higher after-tax returns and higher growth under the optimal left-wing or
right-wing policy.
Intuitively, a more efficient economy makes it worthwhile for left and right-
wing governments to shift relatively more public resources into production, thereby
rasing the return on capital and growth. The latter in turn is in the workers’
long-run interest as their wages grow with the capital stock.
23Suppose β = β∗ in open economies. Then any change in government such as β > β∗ would
imply the same qualitative results as the ones derived for the polar cases below.
24To see this notice that dτdA > 0 requires τ
α > α(1−α)2A which is equivalent to τ > τˆ(1−α) 1α
and always satisfied since τˇ > τˆ and (1− α) 1α < 1.
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6 Tax Competition
What happens to the closed economy policies if governments have to decide in a
world with capital mobility and they cannot coordinate their policies? That is a
relevant question when full tax harmonization is not feasible. As a consequence
governments may engage in tax competition. (See, for instance, Sinn (1990) or
Bovenberg (1994).) This problem is modelled here as a two-stage game in the
vein of Devereux and Mansoorian (1992). The capitalists in either economy have
the same initial capital stocks, and the economies are technologically similar,
unless stated otherwise. Furthermore, all agents are taken to be equally patient
across countries which is a reasonable assumption, if the agents can invest in a
global environment. There is no uncertainty and common knowledge prevails.
The governments act before the private sectors do.25 Thus, given the capitalists’
capital location decision the governments simultaneously decide on taxes. Given
the taxes the private sector decides on where to locate the capital. We will look
for equilibria in the Cournot-Nash tax competition game where each possible
match between governments will be analyzed in turn.26
6.1 The Right-wing Government
The domestic right-wing government maximizes (20) taking τ ∗ as given.27 The
FOC involves C
k
τ
ρCk
+ γτ
ρ2
= 0. As Ck = ρk in steady state, Ckτ = 0. By Lemma 1
the equilibrium growth rate of domestically owned wealth only depends on the
25By assumption democratic governments of either political leaning are constantly reminded
of their pre-election promises. Modelling problems of time inconsistency is beyond the scope
of the paper. Thus, in the model governments commit themselves to their decisions. How the
commitment is enforced is outside of the model.
26Game theoretic formulations of the distributional conflict between capital owners and work-
ers can be found in Lancaster (1973) and the literature ensuing from that paper.
27The time subscript 0 will be suppressed in what follows.
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domestic after-tax return.
This implies that the right-wing government chooses τ so that γτ = 0, that is,
its optimal, closed economy policy τˆ , which is independent of the degree of capital
mobility, the efficiency in the foreign economy and the opponent’s policy. Hence,
in any Nash Equilibrium a right-wing government pursues a policy that maximizes
the domestic investors’ worldwide capital income, and it has a completely fixed
reaction function.
6.2 Left-wing vs. Right-wing
Suppose the domestic left-wing government competes in taxes with a foreign
right-wing government, and the economies are similar. As the foreign right-
wing government always sets τ ∗ = τˆ ∗, the domestic left-wing government cannot
guarantee a higher after-tax return than the foreign right-wing government.28
But then ω˜∗ = 1, CW = ηKt = η(ω˜kt), and Γt = γ. Thus, the domestic left-wing
government cannot attract any foreign capital. The FOC for the maximization
of (21) is given by
CWτ
ρCW
+
γτ
ρ2
=
ητ
η
+
ω˜τ
ω˜
+
rτ − 1
ρ
= 0,
since γτ = (rτ − 1) and ω˜τ = z(rτ−1)ω˜r−τ . Substituting and rearranging yields that
the optimal left-wing tax rate, denoted τˇ1, solves
ητ
η
[
z
r − τ +
1
ρ
]−1
= − (rτ − 1). (23)
28This is due to the assumption of common knowledge and the left-wing government’s re-
distributive objective and is intended to formulate a ’harsh’ trade-off. Instead assume that
governments despise capital outflows more than they like to redistribute. In such a framework
Rehme (1999) and Rehme (2006) show that the optimal left-wing behaviour under right-left or
left-left competition would be the same as the ones found here for the cases of perfect capital
market integration.
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As the LHS is non-negative, rτ ≤ 1 and so τˇ1 ≥ τˆ . If z → ∞, then definitely
τˇ1 = τˆ , because otherwise ω˜ → 0 and V l → −∞ which is not optimal. If z = 0,
τˇ1 = τˇ and the solution reduces to the closed economy one. For z > 0 and finite,
τˆ < τˇ1 < τˇ and
dτˇ1
dz
< 0. (See Appendix G.) Furthermore, ω˜∗ = 1, ω˜ ≤ 1 implies
a current account surplus for the domestic economy, N˙ ≥ 0, by (16). Thus,
Proposition 1 If a domestic, left-wing government competes in taxes with a
foreign, right-wing government and the economies are similar, A = A∗, then
for finite z less capital is located in the domestic economy, ω˜ < 1 and ω˜∗ = 1.
The domestic economy has a current account surplus, N˙ ≥ 0. The optimal, left-
wing tax rate τˇ1 satisfies τˆ < τˇ1 < τˇ and decreases in z. Relative to the optimal
left-wing closed economy policy GDP growth is higher, γˇ < Γ = γˇ1 < Γ
∗
t ; redistri-
bution and initial wages are lower than in the closed economy. If capital market
integration becomes perfect (z →∞), the optimizing left-wing government mimics
a right-wing policy (τˇ1 = τˆ) and Γ = γ = Γ
∗ and N˙ = 0.
According to the proposition there is steady state growth in the domestic, but
not in the foreign economy in general. Foreign GDP usually increases over time,
which is really good for the foreign workers.
Second, for a domestic left-wing government facing a foreign right-wing op-
ponent and for similar economies ηˇ > ηˇ1ω˜1 so that domestic initial wages are
generally lower in an open than in a closed economy. In contrast, ηˆ∗k∗0 <
ηˆ∗(k∗0 + φ
∗(1 − ω˜)k0) which implies that foreign initial wages would be higher
in general. Thus, under a foreign right-wing policy the foreign workers would
benefit from opening up their economy in the case of left-right competition.
Third, left-wing governments reduce redistribution in equilibrium if capital
market integration increases. Thus, the effects of the concern for inequality are
24
competed away by fear of losing capital. Facing tax competition the left-wing
government is better off if it puts more emphasis on getting enough capital, in-
stead of simply redistributing income. When the economies are equally efficient
and perfect capital market integration prevails, both governments optimally act
right-wing by setting the tax rates that maximize the domestic capitalists’ world-
wide income.
6.3 Left-wing vs. Left-wing
Each government would benefit from getting some capital off its opponent. Both
left-wing governments face the trade-off between setting high taxes for redistrib-
ution or losing capital.29 If the economies have the same initial capital stocks and
are equally efficient, the left-wing governments’ problem is completely symmetric
in terms of strategy spaces (action sets), agents etc. As the strategies are con-
tinuous variables and symmetric, we contemplate a symmetric game. According
to the symmetric equilibrium theorem every symmetric game that has an equilib-
rium has at least one symmetric equilibrium.30 For what follows only symmetric
equilibria are considered.
Then we have for a symmetric equilibrium that τ = τ ∗ with k0 = k∗0. Thus,
ω˜ = ω˜∗ = 1, φ = φ∗ = 1, (r − τ) = (r∗ − τ ∗) and γ = γ∗. Under that restriction
the FOC reduces to
ητ
η
+ ω˜τ − ω˜∗τ +
γτ
ρ
= 0. (24)
(See appendix F.) The first two expressions on the LHS represent the effects of
29A more general analysis is not easy because asymmetries in the payoff functions may lead
to complicated non-steady state equilibria. However, asymmetries are dealt with in the paper
below by attributing them to differences in A.
30See Lemma 6 in Dasgupta and Maskin (1986) or Theorem 5.10 in Rasmusen (1989), p. 127.
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changes in wages. The third expression shows how the wealth growth rate reacts
to changes in policy. Now
ω˜τ = z
(
r−τ
r∗−τ∗
)z−1 ( rτ−1
r∗−τ∗
)
and ω˜∗τ = −z
(
r∗−τ∗
r−τ
)z−1 ( (rτ−1)(r∗−τ∗)
(r−τ)2
)
.
Around r− τ = r∗ − τ ∗ we then obtain ω˜τ − ω˜∗τ = 2z
(
rτ−1
r−τ
)
so that the FOC for
a symmetric equilibrium reduces to
ητ
η
[
2 z
r − τ +
1
ρ
]−1
= −(rτ − 1). (25)
Let τˇ2 denote the optimal tax rate solving this equation. If z →∞, then τˇ2 → τˆ ,
and if z → 0, then τˇ2 → τˇ , where τˇ is the optimal left-wing policy in the closed
economy. As in the case of left-right competition τˇ2 < τˇ and
dτˇ2
dz
< 0 if z > 0.
Furthermore, ω˜ = ω˜∗ = 1 imply that the current account is balanced for both
economies, N˙ = 0.
Proposition 2 If two left-wing governments compete in taxes, the economies are
similar, A = A∗, and have the same initial capital stock, k0 = k∗0, then the game
has a symmetric equilibrium in which both governments set the same tax rates,
τˇ2 = τˇ
∗
2 . In the optimum more capital market integration reduces redistribution,
that is, τˇ2 < τˇ and
dτˇ2
dz
< 0 for z > 0. Both economies’ GDP grows at the same
rate, Γ = γ = γ∗ = Γ∗ and the current accounts are balanced, N˙ = 0. If capital
market integration becomes perfect, z →∞, then τˇ2 → τˆ and optimizing left-wing
governments mimic right-wing policies.
Thus, although both governments would like to redistribute, the fear of losing
capital makes them choose a tax rate lower than in the closed economy, that is,
makes them redistribute less.
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6.4 Left-Right vs. Left-Left Competition
Consider the RHS of (23) and (25). There is less redistribution if the domestic
left-wing government faces a foreign left-wing government, because for any z > 0
and τ it is true that
[(
2 z
r−τ
)
+ 1
ρ
]
>
[
z
r−τ +
ω
ρ
]
. Thus, for any solution −(rτ − 1)
is lower and so closer to zero in (25) than in (23). Hence, τˇ2 < τˇ1 for z > 0 and
finite.
Proposition 3 If the economies are similar, A = A∗, and k0 = k∗0, and the
domestic left-wing government faces either a foreign right-wing or a foreign left-
wing government, then τˇ1 ≥ τˇ2, and Γ(τˇ1) ≤ Γ(τˇ2) for any z ∈ [0,∞).
Hence, for two equally efficient economies a domestic left-wing government com-
peting in taxes redistributes at least as much when facing a right-wing as when
facing a left-wing government. Also, it taxes wealth at least as much when facing
a right-wing as when facing a left-wing government. Thus, for a left-wing govern-
ment it matters a lot who it competes with in taxes. The comparison between the
two possible opponents suggests that one may observe more GDP growth at the
expense of less redistribution if the domestic left-wing government faces a foreign
left-wing government. Alternatively, one may observe more redistribution and
less GDP growth if the domestic left-wing government competes with a foreign
right-wing government.
In the model the foreign right-wing government guarantees ω∗ = 1 so that
the left-wing government has no chance to attract foreign capital. The strategic
interaction between two left-wing governments is more intense because each gov-
ernment may get some capital off its left-wing opponent. That is in conflict with
more redistribution, but may be worthwhile in terms of growth.
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6.5 Different Economies
If a domestic right-wing government with a more efficient open economy chooses
its nationally optimal tax policy, no opponent can do better, because rˆ − τˆ >
rˆ∗ − τˆ ∗ at C’ in figure 1. Thus, the foreign opponent may choose anything and
experiences capital outflows. An efficient economy’s right-wing government has
higher GDP growth than any of its opponents. This is associated with a current
account deficit for the domestic economy.
Figure 1: Tax Competition Among Different Economies
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Next, consider a domestic left-wing government. First, no matter which for-
eign government it competes with it will set τ = τˆ when z → ∞ and A = A∗.
Second, if its closed economy becomes more efficient the government may choose
D’ or D”. In an open, relatively more efficient economy facing very high capital
market integration, the left-wing government will set its tax rate so that it gets
all the capital. In that case and for any foreign vs. domestic after-tax return
combinations where A > A∗ the tax rate τ approaches τˆ as z →∞ implying that
C’ would be optimal.
Suppose the capital market integration is low. Then the left-wing government
may choose any policy between D’ and D”. If it chooses D”, it tolerates some
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capital outflows as a price for increased redistribution with higher taxes. Such
a policy would be welfare maximizing and correspond to the common notion
of the trade-off between redistribution and growth for technologically different
countries. Notice, however, that it would also imply higher growth than in the
closed economy at D.
Numerical Simulation
A τˆ∗ τˇ γ∗ γ ∆
1. 1.05 0.063 0.113 0.013 -0.005 -
2. 1.10 0.063 0.120 0.013 0.020 +
3. 1.20 0.063 0.135 0.013 0.038 +
4. 2.00 0.063 0.298 0.013 0.198 +
z ≈ 0, A∗ = 1, α = 0.5 and ρ = 0.05
On the other hand, the simulation above highlights that when the efficiency
difference is large enough, implying a policy to the left of E, a left-wing gov-
ernment might redistribute, attract foreign capital and cause relatively higher
growth than any other, inefficient economy’s government.
Proposition 4 If the domestic economy is more efficient, A > A∗, a domestic
left-wing government will optimally choose a policy such that
1. it definitely gets foreign capital, ω = 1 and ω∗ < 1, when the capital market
integration is very high, z → ∞, and D′ → C ′ or the efficiency difference
is large enough (D’ vs. C). It then has higher GDP growth than any for-
eign government, Γ > Γ∗, and a current account deficit, N˙ < 0, and it
redistributes.
2. it may tolerate some capital outflows at D”, leading to relatively lower GDP
growth, Γ < Γ∗, but more redistribution than at D’ and higher growth than
in the closed economy at D. Under this scenario the domestic economy has
a current account surplus, N˙ > 0.
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Efficiency differences and very high capital market integration are really bad
for the workers in the inefficient, foreign economy, because the capital outflow may
reduce their welfare dramatically. As an efficient economy’s left-wing government
only represents domestic workers in the model (a form of left-wing nationalism),
its policy causes the foreign workers to suffer in the inefficient economy.
More importantly, however, the proposition shows that across countries one
may observe redistribution, i.e. high taxes favouring the non-accumulated factor
of production and higher GDP growth than in another, less efficient economy with
a non-redistributing government. This endogeneity effect of redistributive policies
may, therefore, account for the empirical observation of the positive association
between redistribution and growth in samples with many countries linked by
capital mobility.
Normatively, the result shows that raising efficiency is in the interest of all
agents. That is particularly true for the workers with a left-wing government.31
7 Empirical Evidence
The results of the paper imply another interesting prediction. According to the
propositions we should observe that economies that have relatively higher growth
should also have current account deficits. This would hold regardless of political
preferences.
The following table presents some tentative evidence using long-run indicators
for a group of 23 rich OECD countries, for which data covering the period 1975-
2000 were available. The data refer to averages for the period. The variables
denote the following: ”Corporatism” is taken from Garrett (1998), ch. 5.
31A formal argument that the model has precisely this feature for a closed economy can be
found in Rehme (2000) and Rehme (2006).
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If the index is ”1”, then the country is classified as having a ”social democratic
corporatism”-regime. This corresponds to a structurally (long-run) left-wing so-
cial arrangement in a particular country.32 A value of ”2” represents countries
that cannot be labelled right- or left-wing. Garrett refers to them as ”Incoher-
ent”. A value of ”3” stands for countries that feature ”market liberalism” and
represent structurally (long-run) right-wing countries. All the other countries,
indexed by x, were not classified and feature here only for comparability.
”CA/GDP” is an average of the current account positions of a country in terms
of percent of its GDP over the sample period as given by the WDI (2002). ”GR”
is the average of yearly per capita growth rates from WDI (2002). ”Tax/GDP”
is the average of the ratio of all tax revenues in terms of GDP over the sample
period as reported by OECD (2002). ”Redist.” represents redistribution and is
taken from Milanovic (2000) who assembled Gini coefficients for gross and net
income for the sample period. The difference between the Gini coefficients for
gross and net income is then a measure of redistribution in incomes. Finally,
”Y75” represents GDP per capita in 1975.
With these variables an interesting picture emerges for the countries that can
be politically ranked.33 The group of structurally (long-run) left-wing countries
(Austria, Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden) have relatively high growth
(2.1 percent), a current account deficit of 0.58 percent of GDP, high taxes (0.44)
32A country’s ranking was created from a left-labour power index, based on the balance of
power indicator from Castles and Mair (1984) for a set of democratic countries. For instance,
countries featuring a ”1” were countries that ranked in the top five on the left-labour power
index for the period 1985-1990. Countries with a ”2” were ranked in the middle four and
countries with a ”3” were ranked in the bottom four of the left-labour index for that period.
See the details in Garrett’s book. Thus, implicit in this paper is the assumption that long-
run political regime characteristics (e.g. fundamental labour laws, long-run political party
platforms, the unions’ role in wage bargaining etc.) have not substantially changed over the
period 1975-2000.
33The countries that were not ranked comprise Australia, Switzerland, Spain, Greece, Ireland,
Iceland, New Zealand, Portugal and Mexico.
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and high redistribution 17.51. In turn, the group of structurally (long-run) right-
wing countries (Canada, France, U.K., Japan and United States) have also high
growth (2.03 percent), also a current account deficit of 0.46 percent of GDP,
relatively low taxes (0.33) and relatively low redistribution 12.82.
Table 1: Economic Performance, OECD, 1975-2000 (Period Averages)
Country Corporatism CA/GDP GR Tax/GDP Redist. Y75
AUT 1 -1.60 2.12 0.41 n.a. 6382
DNK 1 -0.96 1.68 0.47 18.85 7262
FIN 1 -0.49 2.30 0.42 13.88 5866
NOR 1 0.66 2.86 0.42 15.07 6340
SWE 1 -0.54 1.55 0.50 22.22 6825
Average -0.58 2.10 0.44 17.51 6535
Std. 0.83 0.52 0.04 3.79 530
BEL 2 1.71 1.98 0.44 24.93 6704
DEU 2 0.66 1.92 0.37 15.59 6300
ITA 2 -0.05 2.05 0.35 12.75 5624
NLD 2 3.11 1.80 0.43 14.68 6653
Average 1.36 1.94 0.40 16.99 6320
Std. 1.38 0.11 0.04 5.43 498
CAN 3 -2.27 1.75 0.34 10.82 7381
FRA 3 0.30 1.78 0.42 15.52 6390
GBR 3 -0.89 1.98 0.36 15.15 5831
JPN 3 2.03 2.53 0.28 n.a. 5985
USA 3 -1.47 2.12 0.27 9.78 8162
Average -0.46 2.03 0.33 12.82 6750
Std. 1.68 0.32 0.06 2.94 994
AUS x -3.92 2.01 0.28 14.13 6416
CHE x 5.33 0.75 0.31 7.10 9507
ESP x -1.38 2.05 0.29 11.30 4697
GRC x -3.73 1.56 0.28 n.a. 4829
IRL x -2.53 4.48 0.33 17.90 3435
ISL x -2.77 2.26 0.31 n.a. 6802
NZL x -5.63 0.65 0.27 n.a. 6405
PRT x -3.71 2.56 0.28 n.a. 3422
MEX x -2.184 1.105 0.17 n.a. 4526
Average -2.28 1.94 0.28 12.60 5559
Std. 3.11 1.17 0.05 4.56 1936
AVERAGE -0.884 1.99 0.35 14.97 6162
STD. 2.484 0.75 0.08 4.49 1375
Source: Garrett (1998), Milanovic (2000), OECD (2002), WDI (2002)
This shows that structurally left-wing countries are not doing bad in terms
of growth. Also, both structurally right- and left-wing countries have higher
growth than the set of countries ranked as incoherent (Belgium, Germany, Italy
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and Netherlands). Furthermore, the latter group of countries have on average
relatively lower growth and a long-run current account surplus. This would lend
support to the paper’s implication that relatively high growth and current ac-
count deficits might be expected. Thus, the data suggest that relatively high
redistribution and relatively high growth rates together with current account
deficits are possible.
Of course, the present data cannot explain why we observe a missing tradeoff
between redistribution and growth. In the theory part it was argued that eco-
nomic efficiency, A, and optimal government policies drive any possible tradeoff.
However, data for productivity or efficiency differences between countries are of-
ten unreliable and depend on a series of important further assumptions that will
not be made in the present paper. Thus, evidence for the reason why a tradeoff
is not necessarily observed has to remain a data black box A at this stage.
8 Conclusion
It is often shown that redistribution causes low growth, although across countries
both are often found to be positively associated. This paper analyzes that puzzle
in a model where the possibility of losing capital features saliently in the optimal
decisions of redistributing governments in a non-cooperative world.
When economies are technologically similar, capital market integration calls
for lower redistribution in an optimum with tax competition, especially for two
competing left-wing governments which both care about redistribution.
If a left and a right-wing government compete and the economies are equally
efficient, a left-wing government is unable to attract foreign capital and redis-
tributes at least as much as it would when competing with another left-wing
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government. If the opponent has the same preferences, a left-wing government
will choose higher GDP growth and higher wages at the cost of reduced re-
distribution. The result hinges on the intensity of strategic interaction and the
degree of capital market integration. As capital markets become more integrated,
tax competition intensifies and optimizing left-wing governments begin to mimic
right-wing policies no matter who the opponent is.
When economies are technologically different more capital will locate in the
economy with a superior technology. If such an economy’s government wishes to
redistribute, it can afford to do so - perhaps, but not necessarily - at the expense
of losing some domestically owned capital. Hence, in a non-cooperative world
redistribution depends on efficiency and on a government’s opponent abroad.
Empirically, the paper’s data for a politically ranked subset of rich OECD
countries for the period 1975-2000 suggest that countries that have been struc-
turally left-wing have on average had high taxes and high redistribution, but also
have had relatively high growth rates and experienced capital inflows.
Normatively, the model implies that policies geared to make an economy
more efficient are in the interest of both workers and capital owners. That is
particularly true for the workers with a left-wing government.
In terms of positive economics the paper argues that one may well observe
redistribution with relatively high GDP growth in open economies and that gov-
ernment preferences alone may not adequately explain these observed patterns.
Several caveats apply. For instance, history matters in more complicated dy-
namic games. Competition is among many governments in reality. Other asym-
metries than those in efficiency might be interesting to analyze. Furthermore,
efficiency may also be influenced by policy. These and other issues are left for
further research.
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A The elasticity of substitution between domes-
tically and foreign owned capital
In order to evaluate the substitution possibilities between domestically and foreign
owned capital in domestic production for our multi-input production function we use
the concept of the direct elasticity of substitution. See e.g. Cowell (1986), p. 29.
σ =
d
(
ωtkt
(1−ω∗t )k∗t
)
dφ
 φ(
ωtkt
(1−ω∗t )k∗t
)
 (A1)
where φ(ω∗t ) corresponds to the MRTS between domestically and foreign owned capital
in domestic production. This (point) elasticity is defined around some ω∗t , ωt at a
particular point in time. Then dφ(ω∗t ) = φ′ dω∗t around some ω∗t , where φ′ denotes
the derivative of φ(ω∗t ) w.r.t. ω∗t , and given that we contemplate the elasticity around
some point. Thus,
σ =
d
(
ωtkt
(1−ω∗t )k∗t
)
φ′dω∗t
 φ(
ωtkt
(1−ω∗t )k∗t
)
 =
d
(
ωtkt
(1−ω∗t )k∗t
)
dω∗t
( φ
φ′
)[
(1− ω∗t )k∗t
ωtkt
]
.
If we let the ratio of the differentials approach a derivative and simplify, we obtain
σ =
[
k∗tωtkt
[(1− ω∗t )k∗t ]2
](
φ
φ′
)[
(1− ω∗t )k∗t
ωtkt
]
=
(
φ
φ′
)(
1
1− ω∗t
)
.
Since
(
φ
φ′
)
= ω
∗
t
1
z
1
z
ω∗t
1
z−1
we get σ =
zω∗t
1− ω∗t
. It should be borne in mind that this
elasticity only holds for φ(ω∗t ) ∈ (, 1) and ω∗t ∈ [0, 1), which is the relevant range for
the equilibria in which capital flows.
B The capital owners’ optimum
The current value Hamiltonian for the capital owners’ problem is given by
H = ln ct + µt [(r − τ)ωtkt + φ (1− ω)kt] ,
where µt is the shadow price of one more unit of investment at date t. The necessary
first order conditions for the maximization of H are given by (7b), (7c), (7d) and
1
Ckt
− µt = 0 (B1a)
µt(r − τ)kt − µt(r∗ − τ∗)φkt = 0 (B1b)
µ˙t = µtρ− µt [(r − τ)ωt + (r∗ − τ∗)φ(1− ωt)] (B1c)
lim
t→∞ ktµte
−ρt = 0. (B1d)
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Equation (B1a) equates the marginal utility of consumption to the shadow price of
more investment, (B1c) is the standard Euler equation relating the costs of foregone
investment (LHS) to the discounted gain in marginal utility (RHS), and the transver-
sality condition (B1d) ensures that the present value of the capital stock equals zero
asymptotically. Equation (B1b) determines the optimal capital allocation when taking
φ as given. It is given by equation (8) in the text.
Denoting the optimal choice of ω by ω˜, which is constant over time, and by equations
(B1a) and (B1c) consumption then grows at the rate
γ ≡ C˙
k
t
Ckt
= (r − τ)ω˜ + (r∗ − τ∗)φ(1− ω˜)− ρ, (B2)
which is also constant over time when the taxes are constant.
Integrating the budget constraint (7b) and using the transversality condition (B1d)
in conjunction with (B1a) and (B2) implies that in the optimum Ckt = ρkt. Thus, the
capitalists’ consumption and their wealth grow at the same rate in the optimum.
Furthermore, evaluating the Hamiltonian at the optimal value for the control vari-
ables Ckt = ρkt and ω = ω˜, which is constant, one verifies that the Hamiltonian is
concave in the state variable kt for a given co-state variable µt so that Arrow’s suffi-
ciency condition for a maximum is met.
C Derivation of the Current Account
The change in net foreign assets is given by
N˙ = (1− ω˜)k˙ − (1− ω˜∗)k˙∗. (C1)
From the domestic household and government budget constraints we have
(1− ω˜)k˙ = (r − τ)ω˜k + (r∗ − τ∗)φ∗(1− ω˜)k − Ck + ηK − CW − ω˜k˙ −G+ τK.
Substituting into equation (16) yields
N˙ = (r − τ)ω˜k + (r∗ − τ∗)φ∗(1− ω˜)k − Ck + ηK − CW −G+ τK − V˙
where V˙ =
[
ω˜k˙ + (1− ω˜∗)k˙∗
]
. Substituting for τK = τ [ω˜k + φ(1− ω˜∗)k∗] establishes
N˙ = rω˜k + (r∗ − τ∗)φ∗(1− ω˜)k − Ck + ηK − CW −G+ τφ(1− ω˜∗)k∗ − V˙ .
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We can transform this expression so that
N˙ = rω˜k + (r∗ − τ∗)φ∗(1− ω˜)k − Ck + ηK − CW −G+ τφ(1− ω˜∗)k∗ − V˙
+ [φr(1− ω˜∗)k∗ − φr(1− ω˜∗)k∗]
= [rω˜k + φr(1− ω˜∗)k∗ + ηK]− Ck − CW −G− V˙
+(r∗ − τ∗)φ∗(1− ω˜)− (r − τ)φ(1− ω˜∗)k∗
= (r + η)K − Ck − CW −G− V˙
+(r∗ − τ∗)φ∗(1− ω˜)− (r − τ)φ(1− ω˜∗)k∗
+ [(r − τ)φ(1− ω˜)k − (r − τ)φ(1− ω˜)k] .
As domestic GDP equals output Y , which equals (r + η)K, and denoting aggregate
domestic consumption by C = Ck + CW , we have
N˙ = Y − C −G− V˙ + (r − τ)φ [(1− ω˜)k − (1− ω˜∗)k∗]
+ [(r∗ − τ∗)φ∗ − (r − τ)φ] (1− ω˜)k
N˙ = Y − C −G− V˙ + (r − τ)φN + [(r∗ − τ∗)φ∗ − (r − τ)φ] (1− ω˜)k
which corresponds to equation (17) in the text.
D Intertemporal Current Account Solvency
Notice thatN = (1−ω˜)k−(1−ω∗)k∗ and k = k0eγt, k∗ = k∗0eγ
∗t, as well as γ = (r−τ)−ρ
and γ∗ = (r∗ − τ∗)− ρ imply that in equilibrium
lim
t→∞Ne
−[(r−τ)φ]t = lim
t→∞
[
(1− ω˜)k0 e[γ−(r−τ)φ]t − (1− ω˜∗)k∗0 e[γ
∗−(r−τ)φ]t
]
. (D1)
1. If (r − τ) > (r∗ − τ∗), then ω˜ = 1, ω˜∗ < 1, φ < 1 and (r − τ)φ = (r∗ − τ∗). But
then equation (D1) implies
lim
t→∞
[
0− k∗0 e[γ
∗−(r−τ)φ]t
]
= lim
t→∞
[
0− k∗0 e[−ρ]t
]
= 0.
2. If (r − τ) < (r∗ − τ∗), then ω˜ < 1, ω˜∗ = 1, φ = 1. But then
lim
t→∞
[
(1− ω˜)k0 e[γ−(r−τ)]t − 0
]
= lim
t→∞
[
(1− ω˜)k0 e[−ρ]t − 0
]
= 0.
Thus, intertemporal solvency for financing current account surpluses or deficits for
the domestic economy holds. The same is true for the foreign economy. If we had
looked at that economy’s current account first, the solvency condition would have been
lim
t→∞−Ne
−[(r∗−τ∗)φ∗]t = 0
which is only equivalent to (18), if (r∗ − τ∗)φ∗ = (r− τ)φ. But this condition holds by
the following arguments:
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1. If (r∗ − τ∗) > (r − τ), then ω˜∗ = 1, ω˜ < 1, and φ = 1 and φ∗(ω˜) = r−τr∗−τ∗ . Thus
(r∗ − τ∗)φ∗ = (r − τ)φ ⇔ (r∗ − τ∗) · 1 = (r − τ)
(
r − τ
r∗ − τ∗
)
which is true.
2. If (r∗ − τ∗) < (r − τ), then ω˜∗ < 1, ω˜ = 1, and φ∗ = 1 and φ(ω˜∗) = r∗−τ∗r−τ . Thus
(r∗ − τ∗)φ∗ = (r − τ)φ ⇔ (r∗ − τ∗)
(
r∗ − τ∗
r − τ
)
= (r − τ) · 1
which is true.
Hence, the intertemporal solvency condition is met for the economies.
E Optimal closed economy policies
The government’s problem is: max
τ
(1 − β)V r + β V l, where β is the social weight
attached to the workers’ intertemporal welfare. The FOC is given by
ητ
η
= −rτ − 1
βρ
⇔ (1− α)E
τE
= −αE − 1
βρ
⇔ (1− α)βρ = τ − ατE
where η = 1−αα r and rτ = αE(1− λ) with E ≡ (1− α)A[τ ]−α. Thus, the optimal tax
rate solves
(1− α)βρ = τ [1− α(1− α)Aτ−α] . (E1)
Lemma γ(τ) is inversely related to β.
Proof: As γ(τ) = αAτ1−α − τ − ρ, γτ < 0 for any τ > τˆ as determined by (E1).
Suppose β > 0. Then τˇ solves (E1) and by the implicit function theorem dτˇdβ > 0.
Thus, dγdβ = γτ
dτˇ
dβ < 0 which proves the lemma.
From the Lemma and equation (E1) the optimal right-wing (β = 0) policy implies
τ = τˆ , that is, it maximizes growth.
F The left-wing government’s problem
The left-wing government maximizes
∫∞
0 lnC
W
t e
−ρtdt with respect to its tax rate. Re-
call that
CWt = ηKt = η
[
ω˜k0e
γt + φ(ω˜∗)(1− ω˜∗)k∗0eγ
∗t
]
.
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For constant policies in the optimum employ the Leibniz Rule and differentiate through
the integral to obtain ∫ ∞
0
(
∂CWt
∂τ
1
CWt
)
e−ρtdt = 0 where (F1)
∂CWt
∂τ
1
CWt
=
ητ Kt + η ∂Kt∂τ
η Kt
=
ητ
η
+
∂Kt
∂τ
1
Kt
. (F2)
The term ητη is constant over time. For the change in Kt one gets
∂Kt
∂τ
= ω˜τk0eγt + γτ ω˜k0eγt · t
+φτ (1− ω˜∗)k∗0eγ
∗t − ω˜∗τφk∗0eγ
∗t + γ∗τφ(1− ω˜∗)k∗0eγ
∗t · t. (F3)
Then we have in a symmetric equilibrium that τ = τ∗ with k0 = k∗0. Thus, ω˜ = ω˜∗ = 1,
φ = φ∗ = 1, (r − τ) = (r∗ − τ∗) and γ = γ∗. Then equation (F3) reduces to
∂Kt
∂τ
= ω˜τk0eγt + γτ ω˜k0eγt · t+ 0− ω˜∗τ · 1 · k∗0eγ
∗t + 0. (F4)
Furthermore, Kt = k0eγt in a symmetric equilibrium. But then
∂Kt/∂τ
Kt
=
ω˜τk0e
γt + γτ ω˜k0eγt · t− ω˜∗τ · 1 · k∗0eγ
∗t
k0eγt
= ω˜τ − ω˜∗τ + γτ · t (F5)
when k0 = k∗0. Thus, the FOC in a symmetric equilibrium boils down to[
ητ
η
+ ω˜τ − ω˜∗τ
]
1
ρ
+ γτ
∫ ∞
0
t · e−ρtdt = 0. (F6)
Integrating and simplification yield
ητ
η
+ ω˜τ − ω˜∗τ +
γτ
ρ
= 0 (F7)
which is equivalent to the expression in (24).
G The optimal left-wing tax rates decrease in z
The FOCs for the left-wing governments in equation (23) and (25) can be summarized
by
ητ
η
+
rτ − 1
ρ
+
zx(r − τ − 1)
r − τ = ∆ = 0,
where x = 1 in (23), and x = 2 in (25). To find the response of the optimal tax rate
satisfying the FOC we use the implicit function theorem to get Adτ +Bdz = 0, where
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A ≡ ∂∆∂τ and B ≡ ∂∆∂z , which are given by
A =
(
ηττ · η − ητητ
η2
+
rττ
ρ
+
zx·rττ
r−τ − zx(rτ − 1)2
(r − τ)2
)
and B = x
(
rτ − 1
r − τ
)
.
For finite z one easily verifies that rττ < 0, η > 0, ητ > 0, ηττ < 0 and (rτ − 1) < 0 for
the optimal tax rates τˇ1 and τˇ2. Hence, A < 0 and B < and so
dτˇi
dz
= −B
A
< 0 for i = 1, 2.
Thus, the optimal tax rates for the left-wing governments decrease in z under left-right
and left-left competition among similar economies.
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